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Electromagnetic Attack: Is Your Infrastructure and Data at Risk? 
Michael B. Hayden 
 
Introduction 
The general population’s fascination with esoteric, state-of-the-art weapons is quite real.  
The movies are full of ray guns, phasors,  disintegration rays real and imagined.  Recently 
email, eHeadlines and even spam promise a variety of new futuristic ways to attack the 
infrastructure, network and your data security.    Do It Yourself (DIY) books are 
available and describe the construction of ion weapons, lasers and particle beam weapons 
that promise destruction at a distance.   
 
You have worked hard to secure your network and data.  You’ve got intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), backups, corporate firewalls, personal firewalls, honey pots, bullet-proof 
armoring and centralized logging.  You’ve eliminated or minimized single point failures, 
installed redundant systems and are a believer of defense in depth.  Your security policies 
and procedures are in order, and you have corporate or institutional buy-in as a reward.  
You are aware that the most important aspect of data and network security is physical 
security, so you keep things properly buttoned up behind locked doors and you control 
physical access. 
 
But now you hear the bad guys have RFWs,  HPMs, TEDs, UWBs, EMPs , EMI,  
HEMPs  and more.  Is this stuff for real?  And if it is, can you protect yourself and your 
systems from damage or total destruction from a perpetrator outside your perimeter 
defenses?  It’s time to think about these things before you fall victim to your own 
technology. 
 
Definitions – Get Familiar 
We are no strangers to acronyms, but some of these devices, jargon and technologies may 
be new to many of us.  Let’s take a moment to explore their meaning before we proceed.  
 
RFWs – Radio Frequency Weapons, some varieties of which are called Radio Frequency 
Munitions or RFMs.  These are devices that generate intense pulses of electromagnetic 
energy in the radio portion of the spectrum
1.  Narrowly directed energy so generated can 
be directed over a large distance to a point target, or more widely transmitted to attack a 
broad target. 
 
Radio Frequency (RF) weapons can be categorized into two main groups, High Power 
Microwave (HPM devices or Ultra Wide Band (UWB) systems.   Their purpose is to 
introduce abnormally high levels of RF (Radio Frequency) energy into the target’s 
electronics, thereby destroying or degrading it.  HPMs and UWBs look like radio 
transmitters. They must include a power source, amplifier and antenna system. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf © SANS Institute 2001, Author retains full rights
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TEDs – Transient Electromagnetic Devices.  A TED is another form of directed energy 
weapon, different from a HPM in that instead of generating a continuous train of energy 
as a HPM does, it creates a spike-like form of energy for a fleeting amount of time.  By 
analogy, the electrostatic discharge (ESD) you cause from shuffling across a carpet on a 
dry day and then touching delicate electronics is similar.  Both the TED and the ESD 
generate a very brief, very high voltage discharge that can momentarily break, and 
perhaps irreparably damage the functionality of sensitive electronic circuits, memory, 
CPUs and various semiconductors. 
 
EMPs – Electromagnetic Pulse.  EMP as a destructive force was first notice during the 
early testing of high altitude airburst nuclear weapons.  Although the detonation of the 
weapons occurred high in the atmosphere where the ground affects of the physical blast 
were minimal, these airbursts were found to generate an intense electromagnetic pulse in 
the vicinity of the detonation.  The generated electric field on the ground, though 
transient, can be intense and amount to thousands of volts.  This is plenty sufficient to be 
of military significance in that exposed electrical conductors and unprotected electronic 
components can be irreversibly damaged or ruined.  A variety of non-nuclear 
methodologies have been substituted to create EMPs.   For instance it is possible to use a 
conventional explosion to rapidly compress a magnetic field in a carefully designed 
device.    The intense magnetic field generated by such a device can create peak currents 
upward to a million amps, with energies measures in the mega joule range.  Such devices 
are not yet particularly small, self contained or convenient to transport and position. 
 
EMI – Electromagnetic Interference.  Most electronic devices are susceptible to 
degradation or malfunction if too much unwanted electromagnetic energy is coupled into 
them.  Our Government recognizes this vulnerbility, and has established guidelines
2 
limiting the magnitude of interference emitted by consumer electronic devices so they 
don’t interfere with other electronics and communications services.  These guidelines are 
frequency specific.  Once emission limits by frequency  are established, manufactures of 
new equipment can and often do “harden” their equipment to function properly when 
exposed to at least these levels of EMI .  It can be costly to so, however, and 
manufacturers of all but the most critical of electronic hardware to not tend to over 
protect their designs.  The Government’s position in this is that if they set absolute 
quantitative levels of unwanted emissions from different forms of user electronics, and 
the manufacturers of devices provide a reasonable immunity to these interference levels, 
the rest of the solution comes from separation distance.   
 
Since electromagnetic energy falls off as the square of the distance between the 
interfering and interfered with devices, sufficient physical separation can help mitigate 
the affects of EMI.  This is why your radio might pick up noise from your computer when 
placed side-by-side, but that same radio works fine from across the room. 
 
                                                 
2 US Code of Federal Regulations, CFR 47 Telecommunications, Part 15 “Radio Frequency Devices” 
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The Educated Garage Mechanic 
Can these esoteric radio wave devices be constructed?  Given sufficient time money and 
size, the current state of technology suggests they not only can be, they have been.   
 
The literature is full of accounts both in the form of expert testimony
3 
4, and anecdotal 
reports
5 
6 that suggest proof of concept devices have been constructed and tested. The 
more important issue is the probability that an antagonist who is constrained by size, 
money or materials could construct such a device.  The possibility cannot be ruled out. 
 
In declarations before the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress in 1998, 
experts in the field are of the opinion that a damaging device can be constructed with 
parts available for purchase at a hardware store using tools common in an average 
machine shop.  Quoting Mr. Schriner’s testimony from that presentation  
 
  “The net result of all this design, experimentation, fabrication and measurement 
proves that such a weapon system could be made by anyone with an engineering degree 
or even a bright technician with good hardware experience. … The materials needed are 
nothing special, and if the effort is made, advanced concepts can be made using everyday 
hardware such as automotive ignition systems.” 
 
The commonness of the devices that could be improvised in the creation of such a device 
are such that, should there be a need, tracing them would be all the more difficult.  This is 
another attractive characteristic of  currently available technology. 
 
Is this a Potent Security Threat? 
If we presume that such a device can be built at reasonable cost by a properly educated 
and motivated individual, what might its efficacy be against your network infrastructure, 
computer hardware and data? 
 
Quite literally, the mileage may vary.  The idea that such a weapon or device would be 
capable of destroying vulnerable hardware depends entirely on how much energy can be 
coupled into your equipment/electronics.  Estimates of the currents and energies 
generated from specially designed test hardware ranges from 100s upwards to 1000s of 
amperes .  Lightening by comparison can represent 20,000 to over 100,000 amperes
7.  
These carefully constructed prototypes might induce voltages of one or two thousand 
volts into a target. 
 
                                                 
3 Dr. Ira W. Merritt before the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, Wednesday, February 
25, 1998 “Proliferation and Significance of Radio Frequency Weapons Technology”. 
4 Statements of Gen. Robert T. Marsh, Chairman of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection before the House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and 
Development Subcommittee, Wednesday, July 16, 1997. 
5 New Face of Terrorism: Radio Frequency Weapons by Eric Rosenberg, c. 1977 Hearst Newspapers 
6 Mr. David Schriner before the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, Wednesday, February 
25, 1998 “The Design and Fabrication of a Damage Inflicting RF Weapon by ‘Back Yard’ Methods” 
7 http://home.earthlink.net/~jimlux/lfacts.htm © SANS Institute 2001, Author retains full rights
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Swedish scientists are claimed to have successfully built an RF based device that in 
experiments was able to stop a running car at 100 yards
8.   There are reports of those 
same scientists claiming RF weapons have been directed against their financial 
institutions.  There are unsubstantiated claims that similar weaponry has been used 
against unnamed British banking and financial institutions, supposedly reported by the 
London Times. 
 
Here on the east coast of the US, I recall seeing a “news” clip on the television in early 
2001 of what appeared to be a mobile device used by the Los Angeles Police Department 
to stop vehicles trying to evade the law. A device carried aboard and fired by the squad 
car  was said to emit unspecified energy that disrupted a target car’s computer control 
causing it to stall out.  I presume your restored ’57 Chevy would have continued to run 
normally due to its lack of fancy electronics. 
 
Still, with the current state of the art and the fact that effectiveness is sensitive to 
separation distance and the degree of electromagnetic coupling, it seems that today’s 
devices are very much limited in their range and effectiveness. 
 
Effectiveness can be enhanced by building bigger devices, along with super-sizing their 
power supplies, but my research suggests that any sufficiently powerful device would 
occupy considerable volume – perhaps truck sized.   Such a device would have a range 
measured in feet and likely be a one shot device if it was intended to destroy electronic 
devices rather than just temporarily interfere with them. 
 
I can find no concrete evidence that a sufficiently powerful device can be built today 
(Summer 2001), much less than built into a suitcase and carried into a building to wreak 
havoc on network devices.   
 
EMI and EMP pulses generated as a result of  nuclear weapon airburst are hundreds of 
times larger and would cause significant destruction of unhardened electronics resulting 
from EMP. Fortunately for the vast majority of civilian system administrators,  a cooked 
server is of little practical concern if a nuclear bomb has just been detonated over their 
heads.       
 
No one really  knows how susceptible commercial electronic systems might be to a 
concerted EMI based attack tomorrow as technology advances and more experimentation 
takes place by a breed of radio savvy black hats. 
 
 
Vulnerability Estimate 
So what are the chances you are vulnerable to such a designer weapon?  We can attempt 
an order of magnitude calculation using reasoned guesses. So let’s define the following 
parameters and then assign them estimated values. These are my estimates, modify them 
to your liking: 
                                                 
8 “RF Weapons and the Infrastructure”, by Robert Schweitzer, submitted to the House Joint Economic 
Committee on June 17, 1997. © SANS Institute 2001, Author retains full rights
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Probability that you’ll be the target (A) 
Probability that Bad Guys can get in range of the target (B) 
Probability that sufficient unwanted energy can be coupled into your system (C) 
Probability that the attack will destroy the target (D) 
Probability of a RF weapon of some type is used (E) 
Number of attacks a year 
 
What is the likelihood that you will be a target and not the guy/gal next door?  We need 
to make some reasonable assumptions.  Are you a Fortune 500 company?  Military or 
Government institution?   There are about 1200 government agencies
9. There are over 5.5 
million businesses in the USA (1998)
10. Let’s say there are 5000 worthwhile, high 
visibility targets that are worth the risk.  Your chances are 5000/5,500,000 or about 
0.000909 (0.0909%). So let A = 0.0009 
 
Can an attacker get a big enough device near enough to you to do damage?  In the places 
I have worked, my hardware has been as close as 20 feet from a driveway (but inside a 
building), and as far as a ten minute walk up many flights of stairs or horizontally.  On 
average, I would say that any target of mine is perhaps 200 feet away from a place where 
a truck could be parked.  If an effective range of a truck-sized device is 50ft (a reasonable 
guess), and it’s effectiveness is diminished as the square of the distance separating us 
because of spreading losses, the probability my equipment might be damaged 200 ft away 
(four times the sure-kill distance) is about (1/4^2) or 1/16 = 0.0625 (a bit over 6%).  So 
let B = 0.06 
 
What are the chances enough energy can be transferred into your equipment?  This is a 
function of the device and what is connected to it.  We use a lot of cable, and cables act 
as antennas to RF energy.  10 Base T wire, power lines, phone cables and the like make 
us pretty vulnerable.  Are you shielded?  You may be in pretty good shape if you are the 
military or the Government.  But most of the rest of us are using COTS (Commercial Off 
the Shelf) hardware and don’t give it another thought, relying on manufacturing standards  
- where they exist - as our only means of protection.  The probability may be about 0.8 
that you are under protected, so C = 0.8 (80%). 
 
If energy can be coupled into your electronics, will it destroy them?   You could 
experience a range of damage.  There could be no discernible affect, impairment or 
outright destruction.  Induced currents generate heat.  High currents could dissipate 
significant thermal energy inside the hardware.  MOS devices (typically transistors, IC 
and chips) may be damaged by high electric fields.  Yet, practical experience tells us that 
the likelihood of damage may be small.  Your electronics are not always destroyed by a 
proximity lightening strike, and they are significant events compared to the estimated 
power from an RF attack.  Let’s guess that a kill likelihood is only 0.05 (5%) so D=0.1 or 
one in 20. 
 
                                                 
9 http://www.lib.lsu.edu/gov/fedgov.html 
10 http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/usst98.xls © SANS Institute 2001, Author retains full rights
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The probability that your attacker will be using a state of the art RF weapon is low. Other 
attack schemes are more likely: viruses, Trojans, worms, break-in, social engineering and 
such.  Will 1 in 1000 be willing to give it a try?  Maybe 1 in 10,000?  The latter is 
probably closer, so E = 1/10000 or 0.0001 (0.01%). 
 
Finally, how many attacks are you likely to suffer a year?  From all attack sources, maybe 
a few a day?  We are electronically pounded relentlessly where I work.  Let’s say 500 
times a year?  So let F = 500. 
 
Probability Estimate 
Mathematically, the combined probability of things that are independent of one another is 
the multiplication of the individual probabilities, or Pr[A and B] = Pr[A] x Pr[B].   
Extend this to our situation and multiply by the number of expected attacks, or  
 
 P = F (A x B x C x D x E) 
 
Where P is the probability you will get hit by a destructive RF device in the next year.  
 
P = 500 ( 0.0009 x 0.06 x 0.8 x 0.05 x 0.01) 
P = 1.081E-5 
P=  0.0000108, or roughly once per 100,000 incidents. 
 
 
 
What can you do? 
    Countermeasure do exist and some are deceptively simple.  Distance is a good 
countermeasure to this type of attack mechanism, so placing critical equipment a good 
distance from possible attackers is wise.  Since power flux density deceases proportional 
to the distance squared, a modest increase in distance provides a substantial increase in 
protection. 
 
Proper grounding of equipment is essential.  Whenever possible, a solid earth ground 
should be used, arranged in a star configuration.  Rather than individually grounding all 
chassis, it is better to run each to a single ground system.  Always be mindful of local 
building code requirements before you install a new ground system or modify one that 
already exists.  You may unwittingly make your system more prone to damage if your 
grounding solution is not properly engineered and implemented. 
 
Adequate shielding is important for sensitive installations.  Induced EMF is coupled into 
electronic equipment by direct conduction through attached wires and cables.  The use of 
shielded cables where possible will minimize pickup of unwanted energy.  So will careful 
use of line filters and surge suppressors on AC power lines.  The effect you want to block 
is similar to the surge and impulses you see with a close in lightening strike, so similar 
methods are useful here.  Data, power, telephone and fixed electrical wiring are among 
the conductors that can pick up potentially damaging impulses. Physically disconnecting © SANS Institute 2001, Author retains full rights
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cables from sensitive equipment when not in use can be considered in special cases, or 
when there is time to react to an imminent threat. 
 
Radio frequencies and EMF can enter equipment through ventilation holes, electrical 
interfaces and the gaps between metal panels.  These apertures can admit energy and 
direct energy into your equipment as an aperture or slot antenna depending on their 
physical size, geometry and the wavelength (related to the frequency) of the 
electromagnetic interference.  
 
Fiber optics are immune to most of the  EMF pulse interference likely to be generated by 
RF attacks and can be used to replace copper cable in many installations.  Fiber optics are 
not a viable option for power supply lines, so they would remain vulnerable without other 
appropriate protection.  If copper is replaced en mass with optical fiber the infrastructure 
would be significantly more robust against electromagnetic attack, particularly for a 
distributed computing topology. 
 
For very delicate or sensitive electronics, Faraday shielding may be appropriate and it can 
be highly effective.  Faraday shielding involves placing the equipment to be protected in 
a fully enclosed metallic screen room or electrically conductive enclosure.  All openings 
and doors to such a Faraday cage must be properly gasketed with conducting seals and 
care must be exercised to insure cables entering the room are properly shielded and 
grounded as mentioned above.  A properly engineered and constructed Faraday shield, 
RF cage or conductive screen room will safeguard electronics within because externally 
generated electromagnetic fields that could cause damage cannot penetrate it.  The 
mechanism involved is the same as the one that keeps occupants relatively safe in an 
automobile or aircraft struck by lightening
11 
 
With centralized computing you are more likely to be able to properly protect your 
systems, in that you need harden only your computer operations center against attack.  
But as Mark Twain reported once said, “If you put all your eggs in one basket, you’d 
better watch that basket.” 
 
On the other hand, decentralization of your computer network presents a major 
vulnerability to electromagnetic attack.  But, it reduces the effectiveness of an actual 
physical attack that could cripple your network.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Attack of the infrastructure by way of radio frequency devices is technically possible and 
has been demonstrated on a small scale.  The equipment needed to build and experiment 
with such devices is modest, and the materials and technology are easily obtainable.  The 
expertise level necessary to experiment and perhaps build a device with a reasonably 
effective range is not great, and is certainly within the capabilities of an enthusiast trained 
in engineering or electronics. 
 
                                                 
11 Gabrielson, B.C., The Aerospace Engineers Handbook of Lightening Protection, Don White Publishing, 
Gainesville VA, 1986. © SANS Institute 2001, Author retains full rights
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Current state of the art, however, suggests that any such device or weapon would 
necessarily be large, given materials available off the shelf and the power requirements of 
such a unit.  At this point in time, it appears unlikely such a device could be easily 
concealed or positioned in a way that would guarantee its effectiveness against electronic 
devices without being detected. 
 
Because of the many shapes and forms an attack against your infrastructure can take, the 
probability is very low that an effective attack would be waged using an RF device.  
 
Nevertheless, diligence is appropriate and complacency is your enemy.  Precautions can 
and should be part of your overall defense in depth strategy.  Cost effective 
countermeasures exist in the form of shielding and properly engineered systems.  
Effective shielding and grounding reduces your exposure to RF attacks, as well as 
lightning. The damage mechanism is similar. 
 
You may rest easy for the moment knowing that the likelihood of damage due to EMF 
attack is very low.   A bi-annual review and threat reassessment of the state of RF attack 
technology is recommended. 
 
----- 
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